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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased 
THEO SWAN HENDEE, 
Plaintiff a(fl;d Respondent, 
-vs.-
W ALKER BANK & TRUST COM- Case No. 8216 
P ANY, Executor of the Last Will 
and Testament of WILDA GAIL 
SWAN, deceased; GRANT MAC-
FARLANE; DANIEL KOSTOPU-
LOS; and ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and .Ap,pellants. 
REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The plain tiff and respondent will be referred to as 
contestant or in her own name, and defendants and ap-
pellants will be referred to collectively as proponents 
or individually in their own names. 
All italics are ours. 
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ST'ATEMENT. OF· CASE 
It shall not be our purpose in this brief to make a 
critical analysis of the statement of facts in the Brief of 
Respondent. We have endeavored to state the facts ob-
jectively and fairly in the Brief of Ap·pellants. Where 
the briefs are at variance the record will unquestionably 
reveal who is in error. There are several so-called facts 
related in respondent's brief, however, to which we feel 
obliged to refer. 
At page 11 of respondent's brief in connection with 
preparation of the will and codicils appears the follow-
ing: "She relied, and he knew she relied, solely upon 
his advice. (R. 205, 211, 206)" This statement contains 
the inference that Macfarlane advised and counseled 
Gail as to how she should devide her property in her 
will. The record does. not substantiate this as a fact, 
either directly or by inference. The fact is that Gail 
had her own ideas as to how she should devise her pro-
perty and that she informed Macfarlane of those ideas 
on the occasions prior to execution of her will and codi-
cils. He did not attempt to influence he·r or direct her 
thinking in any way, shape or form. He has so testified 
and there is no evidence to the contrary. 
At page 19 of respondent's brief the following state-
ment appears: "Kostopulos disliked the sup·ervision of 
Gail by the trained nurse, 1\tlrs. Floulden. Accordingly, 
he took Macfarlane to the office of Dr. Frank and there 
persuaded Dr. Frank that it would be in the best interest 
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of Gail's health if l\frs. Foulden should be discharged. 
( R. 454) " The fact is conceded by DT. Frank that dis-
charging Mrs. Foulden was Gail's own idea. The evidence 
reveals that Mrs. F'Oulden had insinuated that Gail had 
stolen some theatre tickets from her purse·. This so 
upset Gail that she initiated the proceedings which re-
sulted in Mrs. Foulden being discharged. To suggest 
that this was a devious scheme on the part of Kostopulos 
is entirely unwarranted by the testimony (R. 438, 450-
453, 532, 533). 
At page 14 of respondent's brief the following ap-
pears: "Betvveen the time when the savings accounts 
were thus adjusted and Gail's death, the accounts not 
in the name of Macfarlane or Kostopulos were substan-
tially exhausted while the accounts in the name of Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos remained substantially unim-
paired. (R .. 232, 233)" The foregoing is a true state-
ment, but rather than reveal any kind of abuse of con-
fidence on the part of Macfarlane or Kostopulos, it 
reveals the absence of such abuse. Neither Macfarlane 
nor Kostopulos withdrew nor procured the withdrawal 
of one penny from these accounts for their own benefit. 
Gail had possession of the bank books. Macfarlane and 
Kostopulos at no time interfered with Gail's free use 
of the accounts for any purpose she desired. As pointed 
out in the brief of appellants the bank accounts affirma-
tively show that Gail considered Macfarlane and Kosto-
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pulos to be the natural objects of her bounty and gen-
uinely desired to reme1nber them substantially in her 
will. 
At page 15 appears the following: "He then arranged 
to have Kostopulos call at Gail's home and bring her 
to Dr. Nielson's office where Macfarlane was waiting 
with the will. (R. 331)" There is no ·evidence that Mac-
farlane made any arrangements whatsoever with Kosta-
pulos in connection with execution of the 'vill. The record 
citation of counsel simply doesn't support their claim. 
Again at page 14 of respondent's brief the following 
appears: "Macfarlane also participated in the· granting 
of a long-term lease by Gail to Dan Kostopulos covering 
a valuable piece of real estate on South State Street in 
·salt Lake City. (R. 250)" If Kostopulos was occupying 
the property rent free or was leasing it for some un-
businessl1ke sum, that would be one thing. But there 
is no evidence whatsoever that this lease was not a good 
and substantial business proposition as far as Gail was 
concerned. The p·roperty was income· producing property. 
The only way to derive income from it was by leasing 
it. The lease, like so many other of Gail's transactions, 
is important evidence only because it affirmatively de-
monstrates Gail's mental competence to conduct her af-
fairs in a businesslike manner. 
Also appearin_g at page 15 of respondent's brief is 
the following: "Dr. Nielson made a physical examina-
tion. (R .. 383) He then called in Dr. Roy A. Darke, .a 
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psychiatrist, and the two of them examined Gail S.wan 
and then signed the second codicil as attesting witnesses. 
(R. 838)" Respondent persists. with the misimpression 
that Dr. Nielsen called Dr. Darke for the first time after 
he had examined Gail. This is not true·. I-Ie had made 
arrangements for Dr. Darke before- he had ever seen 
Gail (R. 804). 
At page 16 of respondent's brief is the following: 
"It is significant to note that at the time 
Macfarlane prepared the first codicil, by which 
he would be e-nriched by more than $100,000.00, he 
was a defendant in a case pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court in which he was accused 
of preparing the Last Will and Testament of one 
Becker, whereby he became a principal benefi-
ciary. In that proceeding he was accused of ab-
using his confidential relationship and procuring 
Becker's will by fraud and undue influence. (R. 
221)" 
The foregoing constitutes only a half statement. 
Respondent should have gone on in all fairness and in-
formed the Court that the foregoing case was dismissed 
and that the contest was d:r4opped he-cause of an 'utter 
lack of merit (R. 221). Furthermore, the foregoing evi-
dence could have no possible bearing on the issue of 
Gail Swan's testamentary capacity or whether she was. 
under the blanket of Macfarlane's undue influence for 
a period of five years. It was injected into the case 
solely for the purpose of creating an emotional bias and 
prejudice which would blind the trier of the fact to the 
law and to the evidence of this case. 
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At page 19 appears the following: "Kostopulos 
also told Butler after Gail's death that Macfarlane had 
n1ade a 1nistake when he eliminated Mr. Beam from the 
will. (R. 359)" A reading of the record citation which 
refers us to Butler's testimony reveals that Butler in-
itiated the conversation by asking Kostopulos questions 
about the will and about Beam. Kostopulos answered 
that he knew nothing about it, that Macfarlane had pre-
pared the will. This is a far cry from the stretched and 
t\visted claim made by counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
The first statement in contestant's argument is as 
follows (p. 24) : 
"\Vith respect to Gail's testamentary capacity we 
are willing to here repeat the statement we made in our 
memorandum to the trial court, that the proof of lack 
of testamentary capacity in the record is less compelling 
than that of undue influence." 
Respondent's brief contains no relation of facts and 
no argument to support the trial court's finding that 
Gail lacked mental capacity to know who were the natural 
objects of her bounty; know her property and dispose 
of it understandingly according to a plan. We can only 
assume, therefore, that contestant has conceded that the 
authorities cited in the Brief of Appellants and the 
facts therein related satisfactorily establish that the 
trial court was completely carried away by the rising 
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well of emotionalism created by counsel for contestant 
\vhen he held that Gail lacked testamentary capacity over 
the span of Inore than five years from execution of the 
will to her death. 
The first case cited by contestant on the issue of 
undue influence is In re Hamson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 
52 P. 2d 1103. A comparison of the facts of the case at 
bar with those in the Hanson case reveals many dis-
tinctions. Here we have a woman fully capable of con-
ducting her business affairs, who appeared normal and 
competent to the witnesses to the will and codicils on the 
three occasions of execution, who mingled freely with 
friends and relatives alike during the five years that the 
\vill and codicils were in existence. She was actually 
examined by a medical doctor and a psychiatrist prior 
to execution of the second codicil, who found her to be 
competent, and who gave professional opinions that she 
acted voluntarily and desired to dispose of her p,rope:rty 
in the manner provided in the codicil. We have a lawyer 
who prepared a will and codicils in which he was a bene-
ficiary, but who at all times conducted himself in a gentle-
manly, kindly manner, who was admired, and respected 
by Gail, and for whom Gail had an abiding affection and 
a great deal of sympathy over a period of many years. 
Here we have a man against whom not one word of 
testimony was introduced which show·ed that he ever 
forced, encouraged or induced Gail to peTform a single 
act against her will, and against whom not one word 
of testimony was introduced to show he ever deceived 
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Gail, misrep~rese·nted facts to her, or endeavored to ali-
enate h·er family from her. On the contrary, he 'vas close 
to and friendly with every member of her family. Kosto-
pulos was a friend of many years standing. He had 
helped Gail's father, and attended and assisted him in 
many ways bef.ore Mr. Swan's death. He aided and assist-
ed Gail in countless ways over the years. He was. known 
to everyone as her "very best friend.'' Theo not only 
approved but appreciated the services. rendered by Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos to Gail. It is difficult to conceive 
how Gail, _alone and friendless, would have fared during 
h·er declining years without the assistance of these two 
men. 
· In the H aJ.nson case the evidence showed that Dr. 
1\fcDonald secretly took Marie Hanson out and kept her 
until late hours; that he never associated with her pub-
licly; that he falsely informed her that her brother-in-
law was mismanaging her affairs; that he burglarized 
the brother-in-law's safe and stole books showing dece-
dent's accounts and holdings, and that he prepared the 
will, spirited her to his apartment, furnished witnesses 
of his o'vn choice, and had the will secretly executed. 
Even so, the Court expressed considerable doubt as to 
the sufficiency of evidence to support the trial court's 
finding of undue influenee. What a vast difference from 
the case at bar where a medical doctor and a psychiatrist 
of high repute and who had no personal interest in the 
transaction, examined the testator and then unhesita-
tingly witnessed the codicil. 
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Respondent has attacked that portion of appellants' 
brief that considers presumptions and burdens of proof 
and states at page 28: "Some presumptions may dis-
appear as soon as evidence of the facts is introduced, 
but many do not so disappear but persist to the vetry 
end." Respondent then proce·eds to argue that the pre-
sumption of undue influence that arose in the case at 
bar did not disappear, but persisted to the very end. 
Respondent makes this contention in the very teeth 
of In re Bryarn.'s Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 609. 
In the Bryan case this court recognized and gave full 
credence to the presumption of undue influence that 
arose upon the showing of a confidential relationship, 
procuring a will, and heirship. This Court discussed 
the· role of the presumption, the evidence necessary to 
dissipate the presumption, the burden of proof on the 
issue of undue influence, and the sufficiency of evidence 
to establish existence of undue influence. In re Bryan's 
Estat.e, supra, has never been overruled. The court 
in that case stated : 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that, 
when facts and circumst(}Jnces are shown concern-
ing which a presum.ption arises or is indulged, 
the p~esumpt.ion ceases, and the case is to be 
decided on the evidence introduced independently 
of the presumption; that is, that the presumption 
is not evidence and has no weight as evidence. 
In re Newell's Estate, 7.8 Utah 4·63, 5 P. 2d 230 
and Stat,e v. Green, 78 Utah 463, 6 P. 2d 177." 
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The "facts and circumstances" concerning prepara-
tion and execution of Gail's will and codicils we-re clearly 
shown by the evidence. On May 2, 1947 Gail came to 
Macfarlane's office and told him that she wanted to 
make a new will. She explained to him in detail how she 
wanted her prop·erty devised and to whom. She gave 
logical and reasonable reasons for her plan of devise 
(R. 202-205, 714-717). Thereafter, she returned to Mac-
farlane's office and he asked his secretary to find his 
office as,sociate to act as the other witness to the will. 
Unable to find the office associate, his secretary went 
down the hall and found a young lady by the: name of 
Vivian W eggeland. Vivian W eggeland was in no way 
associated or connected with Grant Macfarlane. The 
will was then executed and witnessed in the normal and 
customary manner. 
In February of 1950 Gail again came to Macfarlane's 
office and stated that she wanted to revise her will, 
giving as one of the reasons the death of Jack Florsherg. 
She advised Macfarlane as to the manner in which she 
wanted the will changed and gave him logical and rea-
sonable reasons for the changes which she desired to 
make (R. 206, 207, 718-720). She left the office and 
returned later, at which time the first codicil was exe-
cuted and witnessed in the normal and customary man-
ner. The said codicil was execute·d in the presence of 
Macfarlane's secretary and an office associate, attorney 
Irwin Clawson. Clawson had known Gail for a number 
of years (R. 834). 
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Shortly before April 23, 1951, Gail again came to 
lVIacfarlane's office and again stated that she wanted 
her will changed. Again she advised Macfarlane a.s to 
the manner in which she wanted the changes made and 
gave logical reasons for the changes that she desired to 
make. We have previously pointed out that on this 
occasion the changes resulted in Macfarlane's interHst in 
the will being reduced in the amount of $24,500.00 (R. 
727-729). She advised Macfar lan·e that she desired to 
have an independent doctor examine her before the will 
was executed. Macfarlane suggested Dr. Adolph Nielsen, 
City Physician, and made an appointment for Gail to 
be examined by Dr. Nielsen. Dr. Nielsen on his own 
initiative and before he had ever seen or met Gail, made 
preliminary arrangements with Dr. Roy Darke, who 
also performed a psychiatric examination of Gail. 
On April 23, 1951 Macfarlane met Gail a.t Dr. Niel-
sen's office. Gail was examined by Dr. Nielsen and given 
a careful psychiatric examination by Dr. Roy A. D·arke. 
The two doctors agreed completely and without rese-rva-
tion that she was competent, that. she was at ease men--
tally, that she was executing the will from her own 
desire and not from force or influence of anyone. On 
that very day, shortly prior to her visit to Dr. NielS'en 's 
office, she had been to Dr. F·rank's office alone and his 
records indicated that 'She was ''feeling fine". (Exhibit 
19). 
The will was executed in the normal manner and 
witnessed by Drs. Nielsen and Darke. 
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In view of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the 
"facts and circumstances" were fully shown, and con-
sequently that the presumption of undue influence ceased 
to exist. 
The role of the presumption is particularly im-
portant in this case for the reason that if a finding of 
undue influence can he based upon confidence, prepara-
tion of a will and heirship this will must necessarily fail. 
But if evidence of the fact's and surrounding circum-
stances pertaining to preparation and ·execution of the 
will dispel the presumption and make proof of undue 
influence necessary to a successful contest, then the will 
here must be sustained. 
At this point we call particular attention to the 
language of In re Bryan's Estate, wh.ere it is said: 
" * * * Undue influence must be proved. It 
will. not be p·r,esumed from 1nere interest or op-
portumity. '' 
" * * * The mere existence of undue influence 
or an opportunity to exe-rcise it, i1s not sufficient; 
such influence must be actually exerted on the 
mind of the testator in regard to the execution of 
the will in question ... " 
See also In re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P. 2d 372. 
Counsel has summarized the so-called evidence of 
undue influence in the Brief of Respon·dent at page 55: 
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"They end their argument upon page 126 
of their brief, with the statement printed in italics 
that there is not a whisper in the record that Gail 
was ever induced to do anything against her will. 
That statement entirely ignore~s the basic fact 
that Gail was a childish and simpleminded wom-
an; that she vvas in confidential relationships with 
both appellants, she reposing her confidence and 
they accepting it; that Macfarlane was GaiPs at-
torney at law, and her attorney in fact and con-
fidential friend, and as such, prepared and super-
vised the execution of the will and codicils ; that 
appellants would be unduly enriches by the will 
and the codicils and that Gail had no independent 
advice in connection with the signing of any of 
the testamentary documents." 
The foregoing quotation from respondent's brief 
reveals the startling truth that contestant's counsel don't 
even contend they have ·shown more than "mere interest 
or opportunity". For what else does their summary 
contain~ 
It would not be amiss to consider the practical effect 
of the rule of law claimed for by counsel. A confidant 
who is either a close relative, doctor, religious adviser 
or lawyer is reque~sted by a relative, patient, penitent, 
or client to help with preparation or procurement of a 
will and in that will is made a beneficiary. Such a will 
vvould fail by operation of law and the beneficiary stamp-
ed !a fraud and a cheat regardless of the fact he made 
a full explanation and regardless of the fact that no 
evidence, other than of "mere interest or opportunity" 
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were introduced. ·such is not and never has been the 
law of this juri~sdiction. The presumption and nec-essity 
of explanation arises to protect the natural heirs from 
losing valuable rights through fraud and undue influ-
ence. The presumption disappears when explanatory 
evidence is introduced to protect an innocent confidant 
from losing a dev:i!se and being stamped a fraud and 
cheat without evidence. A claim that a person has exerted 
fraud and undue influence on another has always been 
a serious matter, and courts have always required evi-
dence to support a finding of fraud and undue influence. 
In will case's in this state under the circumstances of 
this case where an explanation is made the presumption 
has served its protective purpose. From that point on 
inference and innuendo cannot and will not support a 
finding of fraud. Or to p·ut it in the language, again, 
of In re Bryan's Estat.e, supra, a showing of "mere inter-
est or op·p·ortunity" is not enough. 
As far as their contention concerning lack of in-
independent advice is concerned, we refer the court to 
our discussion of that subject in the brief of appellant. 
The fact that Gail mingled freely with friends and rela-
tives alike for five years from ex·ecution of the will to 
her death, together with all of the other circumstances, 
reduces the claimed lack of indep·endent advice to just 
another instance of the broodings and suspicions that 
form such a major portion of contestant''s case. 
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In this connection it is also interesting to note that 
Gail's detern1ination not to leave her entire est•ate to 
Theo dated back to a time long before she had met Mac-
farlane, and before she was anything more than a casual 
acquaintance of Kostopulos. It will be recalled that she 
met Macfarlane in September of 1944 (R. 187). Morten-
sen testified that on rnany occasions between 1935 when 
he first started preparing Gail's income tax and 1944 
Gail had inforrned him that Theo had social position, was 
amply provided for, and that "she did not intend to leave 
1nuch of her property" to Theo (R. 470,487, 488). 
Let us consider the authorities cited by counsel for 
contestant in support of their remarkable contention 
concerning the presumption of undue influence and the 
burden of proof. 
The first case they cite i's In re Pilcher's Estate, 
Von Pilcher v. Pilcher, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143. The 
facts of that case are set out in some detail at page 29 
of the Brief of Respondent. 
Certain obiter dictum in Mr. Justice Wade's con-
curring opinion is to the effect that in order to overcome 
the presumption of validity of a marriage a litigant must 
present clear and convincing evidence as to its invalidity. 
The opinion of the court was actually that the first wife, 
attempting to prevent the second wife from administer-
ing the estate on the ground of illegality of the seeond 
\vife's marriage, was estopped because her objection was 
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out of time. Neither the opinion of Justice Pratt nor 
the concurring opinion of Justice Wade in any way at-
tempts to limit, alter or influence the effect of In re 
Bryan's Estat.e, supra, or the law as applied to the pre-
sumption of undue influence arising out of a confiden-
tial relationship, preparation of a will and heirship, in a 
will case. On the contrary, Mr. Justice Wade cites with 
approval In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 46-3, 5 P. 2d 230, 
1n his discussion of the role of presumptions in Utah. 
The next eas-e cited by counsel i(s Meacham v. Allen, 
262 P. 2d 285. This case involved the· pTesumption that 
a deceased person was in the exercise of ordinary care 
for his own safety. Thi's was a head-on collision. The 
question concerned whether the defendant or the deceased 
was driving on the wrong side of the road!. at thei time 
of the collision. Defendants appe-aled from judgment on 
a ve-rdict awarding damages to the plaintiffs and claimed 
that the court erred in instructing the jury as to the 
presumption that deceased used due care. The court 
held that it was error to instruc:t on the presumption 
inasm.uch ,as evidence had b.een intr01duced conc-erning 
the question of whrich of the p,arties w·as on the wrong 
side of t!h~e ro~ad. This opinion sustains our contention 
that when evidence is introduced concerning a presump-
tion of fact the p·resumption disap:pears and the question 
of fact is to be determined exactly as though 1said pre-
sumption had not existed. We quote from the opinion: 
'' * * * but in this kind of a p·resumption upon 
the making of such showing, the presumption dis-
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appears from and beco1nes wholly inoperative in 
the case, and the trial from then on should pro-
ceed exactly the same as though no presumption 
ever existed, or had any effect on the case." 
The next case cited by contestant is Peterson v. 
Buclge) 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 211. It appeared that Budge, 
the defendant, \Vas a doctor and accepted a deed to real 
estate from Peterson, his patient. Peterson sued to s-et 
aside the deed upon the ground that Budge took advant-
age of a confidential relationship and obtained the deed 
through fraud, 1ni·srepresentation, and undue influence. 
Budge denied the plaintiff's allegations. The trial court 
found for Budge and dismissed the case. The Supreme 
Court reversed and ordered findings in behalf of Peter-
son, the plaintiff. There are obvious distinctions between 
the cases. 
The rule of law for which the Peterson case stands 
is that where a confidential relationship ·exists betwteen 
contracting parties who are also parties litigant, the 
burden of proof is cast upon the superior party to esta-
blish first, that he furnished the inferior party full in-
formation, and second, that the transaction was equitable 
and the consideration adequate. The court not only 
found that the confidential relationship existed, but 
found that a full revelation of the facts was not furnished 
by the superior party and also that the superior party 
gained an unconscionable advantage by payment of in-
adequate consideration. The case at bar and the Pet.e:rson 
case are readily distinguishable. Here no contractual 
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relationship existed between the parties litigant or bet-
ween the maker and the beneficiaries of the will. No 
confidential relationship existed between the parties 
litigant. F:urthermore, no adverse interest existed bet-
"\veen the maker and the beneficiaries of the will. Evi-
dence of a confidential relationship in a contract case 
hears upon the question of concealment or misrepre-
sentation with resulting advantage gained by the one 
contracting party over the other. Whereas, evidence of 
a confidential relationship in a will case bears only upon 
the question of whether the will of the testator or testa-
trix had been overpowered. The very purpose of a will 
is disp·osal of all of one's property upon the contingency 
of death. No consideration running from the beneficiary 
to the mal\:er of the will is necessary. The fact that a 
beneficiary also occupies a confidential relationship with 
the maker does not preclude him as a beneficiary, if such 
be the maker's will. 
The next case cited by contestant is Omega Inv. Co. 
v. Woolley et. al.J 72 Utah 474, 271 Pac. 797. In that case 
Woolley, the defendant, procured an important stock 
interest in plaintiff corporation fron1 Baldwin, who 
owned the controlling interest in the corporation. Wool-
ley had gained Bald\vin's confidence; was his confidential 
adviser in whom Baldwin had the utn1ost faith. Woolley 
possessed superior knowledge, understanding and in-
for~1ation concerning the invest1nent company. He did 
not reveal this infor1nafion to his confidant. His con-
fidential relationship had been used to obtain a tremend-
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ous advantage over Baldwin. Here again was a business 
deal in which the superior party to a confidential rela-
tionship obtained an unconscionable advantage over an 
inferior party. 
In the case at bar there \vas no issue of superior 
infor1nation, concealment, fraud or misrepresentation. 
Gail knew that by her will she was leaving her property 
to the parties na1ned upon the contingency of her death. 
Contestant can hardly make a clain1 to the contrary. No 
contest of conflicting interests was involved whatsoever, 
and, as we have pointed out, Gail's determination not to 
leave all her estate to Theo had been constant and stead-
fast for years, dating back to a time long before she had 
ever 1net l\Tacfarlane (R·. 470, 487, 488). 
The next case cited by contestant is Jard.in.e v. Archi-
bald, decided January 24, 1955, 279 P. 2d 454. That case 
involved gifts made by decedent in her lifetime to certain 
of her children. The legality of these gifts was attacked 
following her death by other of her children. The dis-
tinction between the J a.rd'in.e case and the case at bar is 
readily discernible. In a gift case there is an immediate 
tra.nsfer. The donor has lost the right to use and dispose 
of his own property. This fact alone would render any 
gift to a confidant immediately most circumspect. In a 
will case, the maker of the will has no intention of divest-
ing himself of property, except only upon the contingency 
of death. Therefore, his position during his lifetime is 
not materially altered or changed. 
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The usual, customary and normal thing is for the 
various devises to be made to individuals occupying con-
fidential relationships \Vith the maker of a will. It i8 
also a frequent and con11non occurrence for such a con-
fidant to participate in preparation or to procure the 
preparation of a \vill. The law has always been uniforn1 
that such persons are not necessarily precluded fron1 
participation in the estate of a deceased person simply 
because they occupied a confidential relationship with 
deceased and pa.rticipated in preparation of the will. 
Th:lr. Justice \Vade states the rule in the Jardine case 
as follows: 
"It is well settled that where a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship exists between the donor 
wnd donee, equity raises a presumption against 
the validity of such transactions and the burden 
is cast upon the donee to prove their validity and 
that there was no fraud or undue influence by 
proving affirmatively and by clear and convincing 
evidence co1nplia.nce with equitable requisites." 
This principle by its own terms is confined to gift 
cases. 
In the J a,rdine case the appellants clain1ed in their 
brief, an1ong other things, that a confidential relation-
ship existed bet,veen the donor and the donee and that 
the burden therefore rested with the donee to overco1ne 
the presumption of undue influence hy clear and con-
vincing proof. 
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It was respondent's position that the evidence did 
not establish a confidential relationship between the 
donor and the donee and that the evidence was sufficient 
to support a finding that the gift was freely and volun-
tarily made. 
This court based its op1n1on upon the proposition 
that even though a confidential relationship existed, 
nevertheless the evidence, \vhen viewed in the light most 
favorable to respondent, was adequate to support a find-
ing of lack of undue influence. Therefore, the role of 
the presumption did not assume a position of importance 
in the case. 
The Jardine case makes no effort to alter or modify. 
In re Bryan's Estate, or to in any way change the law 
of presumptions in a will contest in this state. · 
Counsel also drag in the old case of Viallet v. Con-
solida,t.ed Ry. & Pow~er Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 P. 496, decided 
in February, 1906. That case involved a personal injury 
and a release. Defendant's company doctor treated and 
cared for plaintiff and fraudulently misrepresented to 
plaintiff that his injuries were minor and temporary 
when as a matter of fact they were serious and per-
manent and thereby induced plaintiff to sign a release 
of his claim for the sum of $120.00. Defendant's motion 
for non-suit was granted and plaintiff appealed. The 
court in reversing stated : 
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"In each of the two cases last referred to, 
the facts were equally within the knowledge of 
the plaintiff and defendant, and no relation of 
confidence and trust existed between the parties. 
In the case before us the jury might well have 
found from the evidence, as it now appears in 
the record, that respondent's physician knew or 
had reason to believe that plaintiff's injuries a.t 
the time he signed the release, were much more 
serious than he (the doctor) represented them to 
be, and that he intentionally concealed from plain-
tiff his real condition, and that plaintiff, on ac-
count of the doctor's superior knowledge, accepted 
and acted upon the representations and assur-
ances made by him res~pecting the condition and 
probable duration of his (plaintiff's) injuries." 
The Viallet ·case doesn't stand for the rule claimed 
for it by counsel. Furthermore, it doesn't parallel a will 
case either in fact or in principle. 
As far as we have been able to determine the Pet~er­
son case has been cited by the Utah Supreme Court four 
times. 
Froyd v. Bar,nhwrst et al., 28 P. 2d 135, involved an 
equitable action to set aside a deed. 
Olson v. Ga.ddis Inv. Co., 39 P. 2d 744, involved an 
action to rescind a contract for purchase of an apartment 
house. 
Ashton v. Skeen et al., 39 P. 2d 1073, involved an 
action to set aside a con tract het,veen attorney and client. 
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Glol'er v. Glover, 242 P. 2d 298, involved an action to 
set aside a quitclairn deed. 
In each of the foregoing cases the action was between 
persons claimed to have occupied a confidential relation-
ship with each other and in which one person was seeking 
econornic redress for advantages taken over him by a 
superior confidant. 
As far as we have been able to determine the Omega 
Inv. Contpany case has only been cited by the Utah 'Sup-
reme Court three times. Ashton v. Skeen et al., supTa, 
cites the case along with the Peterson case. JJ1 ollerup v. 
Daynes-Beebe Music Co., 24 P. 2d 306, cites the case on 
another matter. Jardvne v. Archibald, supra, also cites 
the case. Neither the Peterson case nor the Omega Inv. 
Company case has ever been cited by the Utah Supreme 
Court in connection with a will contest case "\vhere ques-
tions arising out of a confidential relationship and a 
elairn of undue influence have been involved, although 
such cases have since been before the court many times. 
On the other hand In re Bryan's Estate has been cited 
four times. In re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 P. 2d 1106, 
involving a question of undue influence, cites In Re 
Bryan's Esta,te with approval. In re George's Estate, 112 
P. 2d 498, also involving a question of undue influence, 
cites In re Bry:arn' s Esta.te with approval. Stal.e v. Bru;n.o, 
85 P. 2d 795, 800 and Malia v. Seeley 57 P. 2d 357, 360, 
cite the case on an evidentiary matter of no interest here. 
In re Newell's Estate, supra, is one of the most frequently 
cited Utah will contest cases. 
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The following cases cite In re N ew·ell' s Estate in 
sup.port of the proposition that when evidence concerning 
a presumption has been introduced the presumption be-
comes nonexistent: 
Buckley ·v. Francis, 6 P. 2d 188; 
Chamberla,in et ,al. v. Larsevn et al., 29 P. 2d 355, 
36~2; 
Fox v. La~vender) 56 P. 2d 1049; 
Pet.erson v. Sorensen, 65 P. 2d12; 
Saltas v. Affleck, 102 P. 2d 493; 
Buhler v. Mad:dison) 166 P. 2d 205, 208 and 176 P. 
2:d 118; 
State v. Prettyman, 191 P. 2d 142; 
In re Pilcher's Estate, 197 P. 2d 143; 
Tut.tle v. Pacific lntermo'U/YI)tain Express Co., 242 
P. 2d 764. 
Finally counsel calls attention to the ease of Glover 
v. Glover, 242 P. 2d 298, as citing with approval the case 
of Peterson v. Bu1dge. This case likewise involved an 
·entirely different principle of law than that now before 
the court. This was an action seeking to modify a prior 
divorce decree on the basis of extrinsic fraud. There 
was evidence to support a finding that the husband and 
wife had entered into oral agreement prior to the di-
vorce by which the wife was to deliver a quitclaim deed 
to certain property to her husban·d. He was to sell the 
property and divide the proceeds. In reliance upon this 
understanding she then obtained a divorce and no men-
-........ 
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tion was 1nade of the agreement concerning the property. 
The clain1 was 1nade that she was induced not to present 
her clain1 to an interest in this property by the extrinsic 
fraud of her husband. The judgment of the lower court, 
sustaining a general demurrer, was reversed and the 
case ren1anded for trial on the basis that this was a 
1natter which could properly be considered in the original 
divorce action and that it was not necessary to file an 
independent and separate action. The court merely cites 
Peterson v. Bu,dge on an incidental matter. The Glover 
case does not stand for the proposition urged by con-
testant, either directly or inferentially. 
It is clear that the Utah cases cited by conte_stant 
and the Utah cases cited by the proponents represent 
separate and distinct lines of authorities in separate and 
distinct fields of the law. It is likewise clear that the 
Peterson, the Omeg·a In.v. Comparn;y and the Jardine 
ctlses have no rna teriality here. 
Inasmuch as witnesses have testified fully concern-
ing the events before, during, and after execution of the 
will and codicils, and have testified fully concerning 
whether or not undue influence was exercised at the time 
of execution of the will and codicils, the presumption of 
fact arising from the confidential relationship· and the 
bequest to Macfarlane has spent its force and cannot be 
considered as evidence. 
Justice would then seem to demand an answer to 
the question: Where are the examples of undue influ-
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ence to support the insidious accusations 1nade by coun-
sel~ If contestant is not required to answer this question 
to the satisfaction of this court before a finding of undue 
influence is sustained, then Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
must stand forever branded as frauds and cheats solely 
on the basis of the accusations hurled against them. 
Counsel for contestant has claimed some items as evi-· 
dence of undue influence. At page 57 of the Brief of 
Respondent appears the following statement: ~'Kosta­
pulos' statement to the \Vitness Butler that l\facfarlane 
1nade a mistake vvhen he omitted Oscar Beam from the 
codicil is likewise persuasive that the preparation of the 
codicil had been the subject of discussion and agreement 
between the two." As we have previously pointed out, 
the record does not substantiate contestant's clailn. On 
the contrary, Butler's testimony shows there was no 
"discussion and agree1nent between the two." Contes-
tant failed to point out that this testimony was allowed 
in the case against Kostopulos but excluded in the case 
against l\1acfarlane a.s being hearsay. 
At page 58 of their brief, counsel for contestant 
state: "Mrs. Frank testified without contradiction that 
Gail tovvard the end of her life frequently stated that 
she could not get 'her papers fro1n l\1acfarlane' (R. ·561-
2-3). Mrs. Frank asked Gail why she did not demand 
the1n but l\1acfarlane had replied with this statement: 
'Gail, you are a sick girl. You can't have your papers 
around the house.' " 
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The significance of the foregoing testimony is ques-
tionable. It is inconsistent with contestant's own clain1 
at page 11 that Gail's confidence and trust in Macfarlane 
never ceased throughout her life. Furthermore, the fore-
going testimony is not proper evidence. It is hearsay 
and the authorities are lmiform that such evidence would 
not support a finding that Macfarlane ever held "papers" 
a-\vay fro1n Gail. See WigJnor~e On Evidence, 3 Ed., S·ec. 
1738: 
" * * * (1) The testator's 'assertion that 
a person', named or unnamed, has procured him 
by' fraud' or by 'pressure' to execute a will or to 
insert a provision, is plainly obnoxious to the 
Hearsay rule, if offered as evidence that the fact 
asserted did occur: 
1868, COLT J., In Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 
Mass. 122: 'When used for such purpose, they 
are mere hearsay, which by reason of the death 
of the party whose statements are so offered, can 
never be explained or contradicted by him. Ob-
tained, it may be, by deception or persuasion, and 
always liable to the infirmities of human recollec-
tion, their admission for such purpose would go 
far to destroy the security which it is essential to 
preserve'; "they are thus inadmissible so far as 
they form 'a declaration or narrative to show the 
fact of fraud or undue influence at a previous 
period.' 
For this reason such declarations of a testa-
tor are by most Courts regarded as inadmissible." 
It is interesting to note that counsel for contestant 
devote only four pages out of a 97 page brief to the 
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authorities cited by appellants 1n their brief. Counsel 
brush aside In re New,ell's Estat.e, 78 Utah 463, 5 P (2) 
230, with the staten1ent at page 59: "The presumption 
discussed in the Newell case was one based upon the 
total absence of facts, "\vhile the one now under revie·w 
flows from the basic facts in the record." They entirely 
ignore the fact that In re Newell's E st:ate is a will con-
test case, was cited and relied upon by this court In re 
Bryan's Estat1e, supra, as well as in many other will cases 
.decided by this Court. They attempt to brush aside In 
re Bryan's Estate, supra, with the statement that it "did 
not contain the basic facts which must control the deci-
sion in the case at bar." As we have pointed out the 
very issue in re Bryan's Est:ate was the role of the pre-
sumption of undue influence in a will contest case where 
a confidential relationship existed and where the con-
fidant p:articip·ated in procurring ·and was a beneficiary 
in the will. 
One of the remarkable aspects of the Brief of Res-
pondent is the fact that no mention is made of In re 
Lavelle's Estate, supra. This is of particular interest 
inasmuch as In re Lavelle's Estate is unquestionably 
closer to the case at bar in fact situation and principle 
on the issue of undue influence than any other Utah 
case. 
In that case, Innnerthal and Hogg both occupied a 
confidential relationship· with Mrs. Lavelle. They had 
care·d for her and attended to her every need during a 
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three year period of invalidism prior to her death. Hogg 
lived at her home and the court found that he maintained 
an illicit relationship with Mrs. Lavelle. Irnmerthal was 
actually guardian of her person for a timH before her 
death. A more perfect opportunity and motive for ex-
erting undue influence could hardly be conceived. Mrs. 
J_javelle completely disinherited her half-sister and other 
relatives in behalf of the two confidants, Immerthal and 
Hogg. I--Iowever, the court clearly pronounces the long 
standing rule of law that: 
"To declare a will invalid because of undue 
influence, there must be an exhibition of more 
than influence or suggestion, there must be sub-
stantial proof of an overpowering of the testa-
tor's volition at the time the will was made, to 
the extent he is impelled to do that which he 
would not have done had he been free from such 
controlling influence, so that the will represents 
the desire of the person exercising the influence 
rather than that of the testator." 
And again: 
" * * * a finding of undue influence cannot 
rest upon mere suspicion." 
In the Lavelle case circumstances were proven by 
proponents with respect to execution of the will and 
the Court held that contestant having failed to "point 
out the person who it is alleged exercised the undue in-
fluence and his acts constituting the alleged undue in-
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fluence" must fail in the contest. All that contestant 
has been able to do \vith In re Lavelle's Esta,t~e is ostrich-
like to ignore that case and to point to the Peterson 
case involving a confidant procuring a deed by fraud; 
the Omega Inv. Co. case involving a confidant procuring 
stocks by fraud; and the Jardine case involving a gift 
to a fiduciary. 
CONCLUSION 
Contestant would have this court completely dis-
countenance the overwhelming evidence that Gail suc-
cessfully 1net all qualifications for testamentary capa-
city; discountenance the testilnony of the witnesses to 
the will and two codicils that no undue influence was 
exerted on Gail; discountenance the fact that the will 
and codicils were in existence for a period of five years 
prior to her death, during which time she mingled freely 
vvith her friends and relatives; discountenance the fact, 
and we reiterate it, that there is not a whisper of evi-
dence that Gail ever perform.ed so 1nuch as a single act 
against her will; and uphold a decision that undue in-
fluence had been continually exerted over Gail for a 
period of five years; a decision based on evidence which 
at n1ost " ... a1nounts to no more than n1ere opportunity, 
colored by respondent's hopeful suspicions." See In re 
Lav.elle's Estate, supra. 
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We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court 
should reaffirn1 the Bryan and Lavelle cases and admit 
the \Vill and codicils of Wilda Gail s.,van to probate. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appellant, Grant Macfarlane 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
N. J. Cotro-Manes 
Counsel for Defendant and 
.Appellant, Daniel Kostopulos 
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